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INTRODUCTION
T HE widespread use of pesticides over the past several decades has
thrust many environmental issues to the forefront of public aware-
ness. Increased attention to the effects of chemicals on the world around
us has generated an unprecedented amount of legislation and, more re-
cently, toxic tort litigation. Courts must reconcile the concepts of tort
liability and compensation, traditionally based on state law, with the po-
tential preemptive effect of federal statutes. The authors explore these
problems of judicial decision-making and statutory interpretation in the
context of the most comprehensive federal law governing pesticides.
I. PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
Under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, federal law may pre-
empt the enforcement of a state regulation.' The Supremacy Clause
states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treatise made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.2
In a series of cases spanning many years, the Supreme Court has de-
fined the circumstances under which federal preemption of state law is
mandated.3 A court must "start with the assumption that the historic
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."4 Preemp-
* Joseph J. Ortego is the senior partner in charge of Rivkin, Radler, Bayh, Hart &
Kremer's Toxic Tort Unit. Josh H. Kardisch and Kevin McElroy are senior associates in
that unit.
1. See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 698-99 (1984).
2. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
3. See generally Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FFC, 476 U.S. 355, 368-69 (1986);
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1104(1986); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983).
4. Rice V. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). See Maryland v.
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981).
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tion can result, therefore, when Congress expresses a clear intent to pre-
empt state law within the federal statute itself.5
State law may be preempted by implication in any one of the following
circumstances: 6
(1) when Congress has legislated comprehensively and has occupied
an entire field of regulation;7
(2) when state law is found to be an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of Congress' full objectives;'
(3) when state law "interferes with the methods by which the federal
statute was designed to reach this goal";9
(4) when compliance with both federal and state law is, in effect, phys-
ically impossible;' ° and
(5) when there is an outright or actual conflict between federal and
state law or where there is implicit in federal law a barrier to state
regulation. "
State law preemption is also subject to regulations promulgated by fed-
eral agencies12 when the latter act within their congressionally created
authority.13
Finally, federal law may preempt any state law whether it is statutory
or based on common law. 14 The underlying reason for this principle is
best illustrated by the maxim that what a state "may not do directly
5. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525, reh'g denied, 431 U.S. 925
(1977).
6. See, e.g., Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 476 U.S. at 368-69; Silkwood, 464 U.S. at
248.
7. See Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Medical Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707,
712-16 (1985). In an earlier case, Justice Blackmun wrote that Congress' intent to super-
sede state law may be inferred when
[t]he scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it, because
"the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so domi-
nant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state
laws on the same subject," or because "the object sought to be obtained by the
federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the same
purpose."
Fidelity Fed Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (quoting Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
8. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
9. See International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987); Michigan Can-
ners & Freezers Ass'n, Inc. v. Agricultural Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 477
(1984).
10. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
11. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368 (1986) (citing Free v.
Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983)).
12. See Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 476 U.S. at 369; Hillsborough County, Fla v.
Automated Medical Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985); Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v.
Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699 (1984); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458
U.S. 141, 153-54 (1982).
13. See Louisiana Pub. Serv. Corm'n, 476 U.S. at 369.
14. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. City of Dover, 450 F. Supp. 966, 972 (D. Del.
1978).
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through enforcement of its ordinance, it may not do indirectly by means
of a common law claim."'15
II. PESTICIDE REGULATION
Federal regulation of pesticides began when Congress enacted the In-
secticide Act of 1910,16 which prevented the manufacture, sale or trans-
portation of adulterated or misbranded insecticides and fungicides, and
authorized the regulation of sales of these products."7 As technology
yielded new plant materials and synthetic chemicals, pesticides began to
pervade the economy and the atmosphere, and as a result, many states
increased the scope of their regulations. 8 In 1946, the Council of State
governments developed the Uniform Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenti-
cide Act for the states to consider, and Congress began hearings on com-
prehensive federal legislation. 9 Congress passed the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)2° in 1947 in order to expand
the protection afforded by the 1910 Act, to provide greater control of
pesticide registration 22 and to protect consumers from harmful pesticides
and deceptive labeling.2a
FIFRA prohibited interstate commerce of unregistered pesticides 24
and allowed a manufacturer to register the product only if it was used as
directed or in accordance with commonly recognized practice, and if the
pesticide was not injurious to man, vertebrate animals or desirable vege-
tation.25 FIFRA did not prohibit the misuse of any registered pesticide2 6
nor did it regulate pesticides moving solely within a state's boundaries.27
The Act, however, did require:
1. The registration of economic poisons or chemical pesticides prior
to their sale or movement in interstate or foreign commerce.
2. The prominent display of poison warnings on labels of highly toxic
pesticides.
15. Id.; International Paper Co. v. Ouelette, 479 U.S. 481, 495-97 (1987).
16. S. REP. No. 838, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3993, 3999; see also Kennan v. Dow Chem. Co., 717 F. Supp. 799, 804
(M.D. Fla. 1989); Papas v. Upjohn Co., No. 88-116-CIV-J-14 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 1989).
17. S. REP. No. 838, 92nd Cong., 2d. Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3999.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. H.R. REP. No. 1237, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1947 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 170; 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-135k.
21. S. REP. No. 838, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3999-4000; see also Kennan v. Dow Chem. Co., 717 F. Supp. 799, 804
(M.D. Fla. 1989).
22. S. REP. No. 838, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3993, 3998, 3999.
23. Id. at 3993, 3996-97, 3999.
24. Id. at 3993, 3996, 3999.
25. Id. at 3993, 3996-97, 3999.
26. Id. at 3993, 3996.
27. Id. at 3993, 3996, 3998.
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3. The coloring or discoloring of dangerous white powdered insecti-
cides to prevent their being mistaken for foodstuffs.
4. The inclusion of warning statements on the label to prevent injury
to people, animals and plants.
5. The inclusion of instructions for use to provide adequate protec-
tion for the public; and
6. That information be furnished to the administrator of the Act with
respect to the delivery, movement, or holding of pesticides. 28
While FIFRA vested in the Secretary of the United States Department
of Agriculture authority over the regulation, registration and labeling of
"economic poisons and devices,"'29 it limited the federal government's
role in regulating the manufacture and sale of pesticides. Those func-
tions remained governed by the states.3" The 1947 Act was therefore
only designed to work in harmony with the insecticide and fungicide reg-
ulations already in place in the states.3
In the 1950s, pesticide regulations were further expanded by the-Miller
amendment to the Food and Drug Act32 which allowed the Administra-
tion to set tolerance limits for residues on food and required manufactur-
ers to provide detailed data regarding their products' efficacy, toxicity
and persistence in the environment.33 FIFRA was also amended to in-
clude nematocide, desiccants and defoliants under the general category
of "economic poisons." '3 4
Concern in the 1960s over the proliferation of pesticides led to the
creation of a Presidential Scientific Advisory Committee, which recom-
mended increased monitoring of pesticide residues as well as expanded
educational programs and federal research into pesticide hazards.35
Based upon these recommendations, FIFRA was amended in 1964 to:
(1) eliminate "protest registrations", (2) authorize each pesticide to carry
a license identification number, and (3) expedite suspension
proceedings.3 6
During that decade, the Departments of Agriculture, Interior and
Health, Education and Welfare also reached an agreement to cooperate
in implementing pesticide licensing and regulation procedures.37 Several
House and Senate committees reviewed scientific data and issued reports
on pesticides as well as on FIFRA's administrative deficiencies.3" The
28. Id. at 3999.
29. Id.
30. S. REP. No. 838, 92nd Cong., 2d. Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4021, 4113-19; National Agric. Chems. Ass'n v. Rominger, 500 F. Supp.
465, 468 (E.D. Cal. 1980).
31. Id. at 3999.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 3999, 4000.
34. Id. at 4000.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 4000-01.
37. Id. at 4001.
38. Id.
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Department of Health, Education and Welfare also appointed a commis-
sion to study FIFRA's deficiencies. This commission made several rec-
ommendations on pesticide use which were considered by all agencies
involved in regulation and research.39
In December of 1970, President Nixon transferred the pesticide and
pure food regulatory staffs of the Departments of Agriculture, Interior
and Health, Education and Welfare to the newly-created Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) in order to centralize and strengthen enforce-
ment of the existing regulations.'
FIFRA was completely revised in 1972 when Congress adopted the
Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act41 as a comprehensive
scheme for the registration and labeling of pesticides.42 By transferring
enforcement authority to the EPA, Congress constructed the 1972
FIFRA to regulate the use of pesticides to protect man and the environ-
ment and to extend federal pesticide regulations to actions entirely within
a single state.43 To accomplish these goals, the new FIFRA prohibits the
sale, distribution, shipment or receipt of any pesticide which is not regis-
tered with the EPA.' FIFRA also directs the EPA to register a pesti-
cide only if the agency determines that "it will perform its intended
function without unreasonable adverse effects on man or the environ-
ment, taking into account the economic, social and environmental costs
and benefits of the use of a pesticide."45
Legislative history illustrates the federal government's intent to make
FIFRA a comprehensive and preemptive statute. In February 1971, the
President submitted a recommendation, in the form of an Administration
bill, to amend FIFRA.46 In the environmental message, which was in-
cluded in the Senate Report on the proposed 1972 Act, the President
stated that:
Currently, Federal controls over pesticides consist of the registration
and labeling requirements of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Public Law 92-516, 92nd Cong., H.R. 10729, October 21, 1972 as amended by
Public Law 94-140, 94th Cong. H.R. 8841, Nov. 28, 1975; Public Law 95-396, 95th
Cong. § 1678, September 30, 1978, 86 Stat. 973-99; 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988); Kennan
v. Dow Chem. Co., 717 F. Supp. 799, 804 (M.D. Fla. 1989); W. Hazeltine, THE LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE FEDERAL INSECTICIDE, FUNGICIDE & Ro-
DENTICIDE ACT AS AMENDED, 1972, National Agricultural Library.
42. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 992 (1984); Fitzgerald v. Mallinc-
krodt, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 404, 406 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Kennan, 717 F. Supp. at 804.
43. S. REP. No. 838, 92nd Cong., 2d. Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3993.
44. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988).
45. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(c) (1988); S. REP. No. 838, 92nd Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted
in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3993; Fitzgerald, 681 F. Supp. at 406.
46. S. REP. No. 838, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4001, 4023. This bill was a composite of H.R. 4152 and S. 745, which
were introduced by Congressman Poage and Belcher and Senator Packwood, respec-
tively. See W. HAZELTINE, supra note 41, at 1-1-1-3.
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Rodenticide Act. The administrative processes contained in the law
are inordinately cumbersome and time consuming, and there is not
authority to deal with the actual use of pesticides. The labels approved
under the Act specify uses to which pesticides may be put, but there is
no way to insure that the label will be read or obeyed. The comprehen-
sive strengthening of our pesticide control laws is needed.47
After both the House and Senate accepted a compromise bill,48 the
President signed it into law on October 21, 1972."9
During the debate over the 1972 FIFRA modifications, the Senate
Committee on Commerce recommended some 65 amendments to the
House bill.50 However, the Senate Committee on Agriculture and For-
estry produced a supplemental report which rejected most of those
amendments.5 Several amendments specifically dealt with the preemp-
tive ability of the federal government.
One of the proposals offered by the Senate Commerce Committee
would have permitted local governments to continue regulating pesti-
cides to meet their own specific needs.52 While local governments would
still be precluded from imposing requirements as to pesticide labeling,
packaging and composition, the Committee argued that they would be
able to "prohibit or restrain sale or use... within their jurisdiction."53
The Committee on Agriculture rejected this proposal on the ground that
it would place an "extreme burden on interstate commerce" '54 and that
"regulation by the federal government and the 50 states should be suffi-
cient and should preempt the field" 5 5 of sale and use of a pesticide.
The Agriculture Committee bill contained a provision allowing for a
state to register pesticides formulated for distribution and use solely
within its own territory to meet specific state needs. However, the regis-
tration was subject to the certification by the Administrator based on a
finding that the state was capable of exercising adequate controls.56 The
Commerce Committee countered with an amendment that would have
permitted state certification only if the state is "capable of preventing
unreasonable adverse effects on the environment by adopting procedures
47. S. REP. No. 970, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4092, 4093-94.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. S. REP. No. 838, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS. 4002, 4008.
53. S. REP. No. 970, 92nd Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 4111.
54. S. REP. No. 838, 92nd Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4066; S. REP. No. 970, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4066.
55. S. REP. No. 838, 92nd Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4026.
56. S. REP. No. 838, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG &
ADMIN. NEWS 4113.
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similar to those contained in this act." State registrations would be for
periods of 90 days.57 The recommended amendment also addressed the
issue of "local emergency needs" as opposed to "specific local needs.""8
The various purposes of the amendment were to convert th state into
agents for the EPA in registering a pesticide to be used solely within that
state, to assure that EPA criteria are met, and to ensure protection of the
environment through a federal registration and renewal process.59 The
Agriculture Committee rejected this amendment because the Committee
believed that it would deny the states the right to register pesticides (with
EPA approval) to meet peculiar state needs. This decision came after
some states, most notably Hawaii, Michigan and Washington, advised
the Committee of the serious economic problems' ° the amendment
posed.
The Committee on Commerce also "strongly recommended" a provi-
sion which would have permitted private citizens to bring suits to enjoin
violations of, inter alia, registration or labeling requirements. 6' The
Committee reasoned that citizen suits could be a useful tool in the en-
forcement of pesticide laws because "threat of citizen suits [regarding
pesticide] misuse [w]ould be a powerful deterrent."62 The Agriculture
and Forestry Committee also rejected this amendment, stating that the
executive branch is the sole administrator of the nation's laws.63 Fur-
ther, the Committee noted that the amendment would encourage un-
founded claims and harassing suits by "professional litigants" which
would adversely affect the administration of the law. 4 However, the
Committee stated that citizens would be entitled to initiate cancellation
proceedings, obtain judicial review of actions or practices with which
they disagree and would be able to intervene in proceedings, all as means
of recourse, but should be restricted from bringing suits seeking
injunctions.65
H.R. 10729, as finally enacted, reorganized FIFRA into 27 sections.66
Section 24, entitled "Authority of States," reflects Congress' intent "to
leave to the States the authority to impose stricter regulation on pesticide
57. Id. at 4113-14; S. REP. No. 838, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4070-71.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 4070.
61. S. REP. No. 838, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS, 4025, 4060-61; S. REP. No. 970, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. News 4106-07.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. In a parenthetical, the EPA commented that it would not "object to an au-
thorization of citizen suits alleging violations only against users and producers." S. REP.
No. 838, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
4061.
66. S. REP. No. 970, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4116.
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'use' than that required under the Act.",67 Section 24(a) gives states and
local governments the authority to regulate the sale or use of any pesti-
cide or device in the state, but only if and to the extent that the regula-
tion does not permit any sale or use prohibited by this Act.68 Section
24(b) preempts any state or local government from imposing or continu-
ing in effect any labeling and packaging requirements in addition to or
different from those required pursuant to the Act.69
Section 24(c) cloaks the Administrator with authority to certify a state
for the purposes of registering pesticides that are ready for distribution
and use within that state in order to meet special local emergency needs.
Section 24(c) is limited by language which permits certification only if
the state seeking it is capable of exercising adequate controls in accord-
ance with the purposes of this Act and if registration for such use has not
previously been denied, disapproved, or cancelled by the Administra-
tor.7" Section 24(c), moreover, authorizes distribution and use only
within a state's boundaries and is not to be effective for more than 90
days if the distribution and use is not approved by the Administrator
within that period.71
The Administration bill contained no provision for state registration.72
Most of FIFRA's section 24(c) was added after the House passed H.R.
10729 and section 24(b).73 Section 24(b) was added to avoid the
problems of conflicting state labeling requirements. 74 This suggests that
subsection (c) was meant to control and interpret subsection (b) as al-
lowing state registration. 75 The testimony of Senator Quarles before the
House Agriculture Committee corroborates this interpretation:
I would like to emphasize that the States have played a major and
continuing role in pesticides regulation. To date, 48 States have pro-
grams covering the registration and/or use of pesticides. We wish to
encourage and not supplant these efforts by providing that States may
prohibit the use of a particular pesticide within their jurisdiction even
if the pesticide is registered under the Federal authority. States thus
are not precluded from imposing stricter standards or added require-
ments, but they may not permit any sale or use of a pesticide which is
prohibited under the authority of this Act. (2/22/71, p. 8)76
While on the one hand the House Committee on Agriculture recog-
nized the need for state registration, the Committee, on the other hand,
stated in its report that:
67. Id. at 4128.
68. Id. at 4128.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See W. HAZELTINE, supra note 41, at Chapter XXVII-4.
73. See id. at Chapter XXVII-3.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. Id. at XXVII-4.
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State authority to change Federal labeling and packaging is completely
preempted, and State authority to further regulate "general use" pesti-
cides is partially preempted. (emphasis added) (9/25/71, p. 1-2) 7 7
That report also states:
In dividing the responsibility between the States and the Federal Gov-
ernment for the management of an effective pesticide program, the
Committee has adopted language which is intended to completely pre-
empt State authority in regard to labeling and packaging. With regard
to this Federal preemption of labeling and packaging, EPA may, where
appropriate, in setting labeling and packaging requirements, give con-
sideration to regional, State, and local needs. The Committee also in-
tends for the Federal law to preempt the States from restricting or
licensing any "general use" pesticide. The States would also be pre-
cluded from adopting programs which are less stringent than the Fed-
eral standards. In the case of "restricted use" pesticides the States are
left free to impose whatever restrictions they may wish (other than
labeling and packaging). The States could also completely prohibit the
use of these "restricted use" pesticides within their jurisdictions.78
Section 24 was ultimately codified as 7 U.S.C. section 136(v).79
It is clear from the Conference Committee Report that Congress in-
tended to give the states a role in certain aspects of the pesticide registra-
77. Id. at XXVII-6.
78. Id. at XXVII-7.
79. Section 24 states:
(a) A State may regulate the sale or use of any federally registered pesticide or
device in the State, but only if and to the extent the regulation does-not permit
any sale or use prohibited by this subchapter.
(b) Such State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for label-
ing or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this
subchapter.
(c)(l) A State may provide registration for additional uses of federally regis-
tered pesticides formulated for distribution and use within that State to meet
special local needs in accord with the purposes of this subchapter and if regis-
tration for such use has not previously been denied, disapproved, or canceled by
the Administrator...
(2) A registration issued by a State under this subsection shall not be effective
for more than ninety days if disapproved by the Administrator within that
period...
(3) In no instance may a State issue a registration for a food or feed use unless
there exists a tolerance or exemption under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act that permits the residues of the pesticide on the food or feed. If the
Administrator determines that a registration issued by a State is inconsistent
with the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, or the use of, a pesticide under
a registration issued by a State constitutes an imminent hazard, the Administra-
tor may immediately disapprove the registration.
(4) If the Administrator finds, in accordance with standards set forth in regula-
tions issued under section 136w of this title, that a State is not capable of exer-
cising adequate controls to assure that State registration under this section will
be in accord with the purposes of this subchapter or has failed to exercise ade-
quate controls, the Administrator may suspend the authority of the State to
register pesticides until such time as the Administrator is satisfied that the State
can and will exercise adequate controls...
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tion process. A great deal of discretion is given to the states to provide
registration of pesticides to meet special local needs but subject to disap-
proval by the administration. 80 The EPA is also given primary authority
for removing its certification of the states pursuant to section 24.81 Addi-
tionally, penalties for violation of the Act are not to be imposed until
states are given an opportunity to comply. States may register pesticides
moving only in intrastate commerce under federal law before the EPA
will prohibit their distribution.82
It is equally clear that Congress intended to implement an integrated
program in which the states would be allowed to regulate the sale and
use of pesticides as long as they complied with FIFRA, and the federal
government would exclusively regulate label and packaging require-
ments. The issue paper submitted by the EPA regarding the Act and
H.R. 10729 noted that one of the Act's "key provisions" was to
[e]stablish a coordinated Federal-State administrative system to carry
out the new program. The States are given prime responsibility for the
certification and supervision of pesticide applicators. The Federal
Government sets the program standards the States must meet. State
authority to change Federal labeling and packaging is completely pre-
empted, and State authority to further regulate "general use" pesticides
is partially preempted.83
FIFRA's most recent amendments were thus specifically designed to:
(1) Prohibit the use of any pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its
labeling;
(2) require pesticides to be classified for general or restricted use;
(3) extend the Act to all pesticides by including those distributed en-
tirely within a single state;
(4) strengthen enforcement by:
a. requiring all pesticide-producing establishments to register,
maintain and submit production and sales volume information;
b. authorizing entry of pesticide-producing establishments for
inspection and sampling;
c. authorizing stop sale, use or removal orders and seizure;
d. providing for civil and increased criminal penalties;
e. authorizing cooperation with states;
f. improving procedures governing registration and cancellation
actions by considering scientific studies and holding public hearings
at the outset;
(5) give applicants for registration proprietary rights in their test data;
(6) authorize administrators to establish pesticide packaging stan-
80. See 7 U.S.C. § 136(v)(c)(1) (1988); see also W. HAZELTINE, supra note 41, at
Chapter XXVII.
81. See W. HAZELTINE, supra note 41, at Chapter XXVII-1.
82. Id. at XXVII-2.
83. Id. at Chapter 1-9 (emphasis added).
PREEMPTION AND FIFRA
dards, regulate pesticide and container disposal, issue experimental use
permits and conduct research on pesticides and alternatives and monitor
their use and presence in the environment;
(7) provide for certification of applicators by the states under a pro-
gram approved by the Administrator of the EPA.84
As a prerequisite to registration, i.e. to comply with FIFRA, manufac-
turers must submit to the EPA: (1) considerable scientific data regarding
toxicity and efficacy; (2) confidential trade secrets regarding pesticide in-
gredients; and (3) proposed labeling. 5
Pesticides registered with the EPA must bear labels containing EPA-
approved warnings which indicate that the product is adequate to protect
health and the environment.86 The labels may not contain language that
has not been approved by the EPA. 87 In accordance with the regulations
promulgated under FIFRA, the EPA not only specifies the particular
warning language which is required, 88 but also governs the registration
and classification procedures, 89 registration standards,90 labeling require-
ments,91 requirements for the submission of toxicological data,92 toler-
ance levels for pesticides in food,9a and even laboratory standards for any
studies conducted to support applications for marketing permits for pes-
ticide products regulated by the EPA.94
III. Toxic TORT LAW
A toxic tort plaintiff may bring a claim against a manufacturer or
seller of an alleged harm-producing product under several legal theories
such as negligence, strict liability, breach of warranty, fraud and nui-
sance. 95 Irrespective of which theory is employed, a plaintiff has the bur-
den of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he was exposed
to the defendant's chemical product in a manner (i.e., ingestion, dermal
absorption, inhalation or injection), to a degree, and for a duration which
may be considered toxic. In addition, a plaintiff must prove that the
chemical proximately caused or substantially contributed to his injury.96
Over the past ten years, strict liability has emerged as the favorite the-
ory of recover. Replacing the traditional liability-based-on-fault theory
84. See S. REP. No. 838, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3993-94.
85. Id.
86. 7 U.S.C. § 136(q)(1)(G) (1988).
87. 40 C.F.R. § 156.10(a)(6)(i) (1988).
88. 40 C.F.R. § 156.10(a)(1) (1988).
89. 40 C.F.R. §§ 152.40-152.55 (1988); 40 C.F.R. §§ 152.160-152.175 (1988).
90. 40 C.F.R. §§ 155.23-155.34 (1988).
91. 40 C.F.R. § 156.10 (1988).
92. 40 C.F.R. §§ 158.20-158.740 (1988).
93. 40 C.F.R. §§ 185.100-185.6300 (1988).
94. 40 C.F.R. §§ 160.1-160.130 (1988).
95. G.Z. NOTHSTEIN, Toxic TORTS: LITIGATION OF HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE
CASES, §§ 11.02-11.25 (1984).
96. See generally id. at § 11.08.
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of negligence with the concept of "defectiveness," strict liability focuses
on the nature of the product rather than on the defendant.97 The Re-
statement (Second) of Torts (1965) provides the most comprehensive and
widely accepted formulation of the strict liability theory.9"
The elements which a plaintiff in a product liability case must prove
are: (1) that a product to which he was exposed was in a defective condi-
tion when it left the possession or control of the seller; (2) that the prod-
uct was unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer; (3) that the
defect was a proximate cause of or a substantial factor in the plaintiff's
injuries or damages; (4) that the seller engaged in the business of selling
such a product; and (5) that the product was one which the seller ex-
pected to and did reach the user or consumer without substantial change
in its condition when it was sold to the plaintiff.99
An "unreasonably dangerous defective condition," the benchmark of
strict liability, may manifest itself in the product's manufacture, design
and/or warning."° FIFRA preemption cases mostly involve warning
defects by the manufacturer. In this context, a plaintiff must prove: (1)
that the manufacturer knew or should have known of the product's in-
herent risk; (2) that there was either no warning or an inadequate warn-
ing; (3) that the absence of adequate warnings rendered the product
defective and unreasonably dangerous; and (4) that the absence of ade-
quate warnings was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury."°' The Re-
statement (Second) recognizes that
[i]n order to prevent the product from being unreasonably dangerous,
the seller may be required to give directions or warning, on the
97. E.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); see generally G.Z. NOTHSTEIN, supra note 95 at § 11.12 (in failure-
to-warn cases, the issue is whether the product is sold without warnings, regardless of
whether defendant knew or should have known that the product was dangerous).
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); see also J.S. ALLEE, PROD-
UCT LIABILITY, § 2.01; AM. LAW OF PROD. LIAB. 3d §§ 16:8-16:9, 16:67 (1987). Section
402A of the RESTATEMENT, entitled "Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical
Harm to User or Consumer," states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if:
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
99. AM. LAW OF PROD. LIAB. 3d § 16.42 (1987); G.Z. NOTHSTEIN, supra note 95, at
§ 11.12.
100. AM. LAW OF PROD. LIAB. 3d §§ 16:1-17:47 (1987); Model Uniform Product Lia-
bility Act [hereinafter MUPLA], 44 Fed Reg. 62721, § 104.
101. AM. LAW OF PROD. LIAB. 3d § 32:2, 34:27 (1987); J.S. ALLEE, PRODUCT LIA-
BILITY § 4.02(1) (1989); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965).
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container, as to its use... a product bearing such a warning, which is
safe for use if it is followed, is not in defective condition, nor is it un-
reasonably dangerous. 102
The adequacy of a product's warning may be assessed in many ways.
Most courts look at whether the labeled product was more dangerous
When it left the manufacturer/seller's hands than an ordinary purchaser
would expect. An ordinary purchaser is usually defined as a person with
knowledge common to the community. 103 Some courts ignore the
seller's perspective and look at whether a reasonable, ordinary and pru-
dent manufacturer would have marketed the product with such a
warning, 'o4
Since absence of a warning constitutes a design defect, nearly all courts
employ a version of the classic risk utility analysis which considers: (1)
the usefulness and desirability of the product to the user and to society as
a whole; (2) the safety aspects of the product, i.e., the likelihood that it
will cause injury, and the probable seriousness of such injury; (3) the
availability of a safer substitute product that will meet the same needs;
(4) the manufacturer's ability to eliminate the danger without impairing
the usefulness of the product or making it too expensive to maintain its
utility; (5) the user's ability to avoid danger by exercising care in using
the product; (6) the user's understanding of the product's inherent dan-
gers and their avoidability, in light of the knowledge of the general pub-
lic, or in light of the existence of suitable instructions or warnings; and
(7) the feasibility for the manufacturer to spread the loss by increasing
the price of the product or by carrying liability insurance. 0 5 If a product
fails the consumer expectation test, several courts, after the plaintiff
shows that the design proximately caused the injury, have invoked a
standard that shifts the burden to the defendant to prove that the benefits
of the challenged design outweigh its inherent risks. 106
Because the balancing between risk and utility is generally done
through the EPA registration process, it is often argued that a product
with an EPA-approved label is not defective as a matter of law. This
argument, however, is not fool-proof and a manufacturer can still be lia-
ble for a defective product if it has actual or constructive knowledge of
the product's inherent risks. 10 7 A manufacturer must also keep abreast
of scientific knowledge, discoveries and advances, and provide an ade-
quate warning if it knows or has reason to know that the product is dan-
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965).
103. Id.; see also AM. LAW OF PROD. LIAB. 3d §§ 17:25-17:29 (1987); J.S. ALLEE,
PRODUCT LIABILITY § 4.02(3) (1989).
104. AM. LAW OF PROD. LIAB. 3d § 17:32 (1987).
105. Id. § 17:34.
106. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432, 573 P.2d 443, 455-56, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 237-38 (1978).
107. AM. LAW OF PROD. LIAB. 3d §§ 34:8, 33:3-33:5 (1987); J.S. ALLEE, PRODUCT
LIABILITY § 4.02(1) (1989).
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gerous.10 8 This requirement can also serve as a valid defense in a product
liability suit. The manufacturer can argue that the technology and scien-
tific knowledge at the time the product was made was not advanced
enough to detect an inherent danger in the product and that it was there-
fore justified in not affixing a warning label to it. The defense recognizes
that the manufacturer can only follow the standard of scientific, medical
and technological achievement in existence at the time of manufacture
and sale. 109 Manufacturer-defendants often argue that registration under
FIFRA represents the federal government's endorsement that the prod-
uct in question complies with the state of the art and is per se not
defective.
Defendants have sometimes tried to fend off a claim by arguing that
their products are "unavoidably unsafe products" and that when cor-
rectly manufactured and accompanied by proper directions and' warn-
ings, those products are neither unreasonably defective nor dangerous. 1 0
Therefore,
[t]he seller of such products, again with the qualification that they are
properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where
the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortu-
nate consequences attending their use, merely because he has under-
taken to supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable
product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.'
The "unavoidably unsafe products" theory can be interpreted as a
public policy designed to encourage swift production and marketing of
products which prevent disease and save human life, although such prod-
ucts may also carry with them the risk of future danger. 1 2 It is no sur-
prise that the courts generally do not impose strict liability on sellers and
have allowed the "unavoidably unsafe products" theory for prescription
drugs, vaccines, blood and medical devices. 113
IV. FIFRA PREEMPTION
Cases addressing the extent to which FIFRA preempts state law tort
claims can generally be grouped according to their holdings which have
been (a) that FIFRA does not preempt state law; (b) that FIFRA ex-
pressly preempts state law; or (c) that FIFRA impliedly preempts state
law. The cases are explored in the sections that follow.
108. AM. LAW OF PROD. LIAB. 3d § 33:3, 32:64 (1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A comment j (1965); J.S. Allee, Product Liability § 8.08 (1) (1989).
109. AM. LAW OF PROD. LIAB. 3d § 32:64 (1987); J.S. ALLEE, PRODUCT LIABILITY
§ 808 (1) (1989); see also Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 746 (Tex.
1980).
110. Comment k of section 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS defines
"unavoidably unsafe products" as products, which in the present state of human knowl-
edge, are incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use.
111. Id. § 402A comment k.
112. AM. LAW OF PROD. LIAB. 3d § 17:36 (1987).
113. Id.
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A. FIFRA Does Not Preempt State Law
The earliest reported case which addressed FIFRA's preemptive
power over state common law tort actions was Ferebee v. Chevron Chem-
ical Co. 4 Defendant Chevron argued that since its product, paraquat,
was sold in the United States only when accompanied by an EPA-ap-
proved label, (1) a jury was required to find that label adequate and; (2)
federal law preempts state common law actions based on inadequate
warnings."' The Circuit Court dismissed Chevron's first contention,
stating that "[t]he fact that EPA has determined that Chevron's label is
adequate for purposes of FIFRA does not compel a jury to find that the
label is also adequate for purposes of state tort law as well."" ' 6 The court
reasoned that the EPA might have assigned a lesser value to, among
other things, the health risks associated with the use of paraquat than
would a jury."I7
The court then addressed Chevron's contention that because state tort
actions based on the inadequacy of EPA-approved labels have in fact a
regulatory aim, i.e., to assure that adequate labels are used,118 section
136v(b) of FIFRA, which preempts state law, is the applicable part of
the statute. 1 9 While Judge Mikva, writing for the court, conceded that
tort actions can constitute regulation, he held that damage actions "can
have both regulatory and compensatory aims."' 120
However, the ultimate holding that FIFRA does not preempt state
common law tort claims was based on allegations of inadequate warn-
ings. 12' The court justified its position on the theory that damage awards
based on state law do not mandate a manufacturer to alter a product's
defective labels.' 22 FIFRA, moreover, expressly allows the states to im-
pose their own constraints on the sale and use of EPA-approved
pesticides. 23
Ferebee's narrow holding was that while FIFRA does not explicitly
preempt state damage actions, it does preclude states from directly order-
114. 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
115. Id. at 1539.
116. Id. at 1540 (emphasis in original).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. (emphasis in original). The court added that "tort recovery in a case such as
this one may also promote legitimate regulatory aims." Id. at 1541.
121. Id. at 1543.
122. Id. at 1541.
123. Id.; citing 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a). See also S. REP. No. 838, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3993, 4021. ("Generally, the in-
tent of the provision is to leave to the States the authority to impose stricter regulation on
pesticides use than that required under the Act."); S. REP. No. 970, 92nd Cong., 2nd
Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4092, 4128 (same); see gener-
ally Nat'l Agric'l Chem. Ass'n v. Rominger, 500 F. Supp. 465 (E.D. Cal. 1980) (state
may require additional data on EPA registered pesticides).
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ing changes in EPA-approved labels.12 4 In addressing Chevron's claim
that FIFRA impliedly preempted state tort law,125 the court found that
compliance with both federal and state law was not impossible. Chevron
could continue using the EPA-approved label and simultaneously pay
damages to successful tort plaintiffs. 126 The court rejected the argument
that state damage actions stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of
FIFRA's purposes, 127 and stated that:
Such a conflict would exist only if FIFRA were viewed not as a regula-
tory statute aimed at protecting citizens from the hazards of modern
pesticides, but rather as an affirmative subsidization of the pesticide
industry that commanded states to accept the use of EPA-registered
pesticides. That interpretation of FIFRA, however, is precluded by
both the explicit savings clause at 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) [sic] and by the
entire legislative history of the Act. 128
The circuit court concluded that since Congress explicitly authorized
the states to regulate pesticide use, the states could require that at least
some of the injuries resulting from pesticide exposure be redressed under
state law. 129 Applying this to the facts in Ferebee, the court held that "if
[Chevron] chooses to continue selling paraquat in Maryland, it may have
to compensate for some of the resulting injuries."13 What actions can a
manufacturer of pesticides take after having successfully been sued under
state law and held liable for damages? The court in Ferebee suggested
that a manufacturer can: (1) petition the EPA to alter its label; (2) choose
not to continue selling its product in the state in which the damages
award is made; or (3) distribute additional information about its
product.' 31
Since Ferebee, several other decisions also concluded that FIFRA
neither expressly nor impliedly preempts state tort law.' 3 2 While these
decisions have closely followed Ferebee's reasoning, they have added im-
portant language of their own. In Cox v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., for
example, the federal district court relied heavily on the fact that the man-
ufacturers play a "significant role" in FIFRA's regulatory scheme.
33
The defendants in the Cox case relied on cases which held that there was
preemption of state law under the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Adver-
124. Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1542 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1062 (1984) (emphasis in original).
125. Id. at 1542-43.
126. Id. at 1542.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1542-43.
129. Id. at 1541, 1543.
130. Id. at 1541.
131. See id. at 1543. This list of options has been referred to in subsequent decisions as
"the choice of reaction analysis."
132. See Roberts v. Dow Chem. Co., 702 F. Supp. 195 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Wilson v.
Chevron Chem. Co., No. 83 Civ. 762 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 1986).
133. See Cox v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 704 F. Supp. 85, 86 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
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tising Act (FCLAA) 134 in an attempt to convince the court of FIFRA's
preempting powers. The court, however, rejected the "misplaced anal-
ogy" and noted that the-FCLAA prescribes the exact label or warning to
be placed on each package of cigarettes, while under FIFRA, a pesticide
manufacturer submits a label for EPA approval. 135 Since each pesticide
manufacturer drafts its own warning label, it is possible that "two manu-
facturers of the same product may use different labels, provided only that
they obtain prior EPA approval."' 36
The analogy with FCLAA preemption was also criticized in Roberts v.
Dow Chemical Co. 37 The Roberts court rejected the defendant's conten-
tion that FIFRA impliedly preempts state law,' 3 ' and held that since
Congress allowed the states to regulate the use of pesticides in section
136v(a) of the Act, "it appears that FIFRA regulations are not so com-
prehensive as to occupy the entire field."' 139
The court also rejected Dow's assertion that an EPA-approved label
precluded the finding of strict liability because an adequate warning ful-
filled the duty of a manufacturer who markets an allegedly "unavoidably
unsafe product."'" Roberts agreed with the conclusion of Ferebee that
even if a pesticide's label meets FIFRA's requirements, it "does not com-
pel a jury to find that the label is also adequate for purposes of state tort
law as well. The purposes of FIFRA and those of state tort law may be
quite distinct."''
Although Cox and Roberts relied heavily on Ferebee in rejecting fed-
eral preemption,'42 they have each added some new insight into the non-
preemption school of thought.
B. FIFRA Expressly Preempts State Law
A growing number of cases decided after Ferebee have held that
FIFRA does preempt state tort law, and more particularly, that section
136v(b) expressly preempts state tort law claims based on allegations of
134. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331 et seq.
135. See Cox, 704 F. Supp. at 86.
136. Cox, 704 F. Supp. 85, 86 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (quoting Palmer v. Liggett Gp., Inc.,
825 F.2d 620, 629 n. 13 (1st Cir. 1987)). Palmer was ruling on a preemption motion
based on the FCLAA. In Fisher v. Chevron Chem. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1283, 1289 (W.D.
Mo. 1989), discussed more fully below, the court referred to these differences between
FIFRA and the FCLAA as a "distinction without significance."
137. 702 F. Supp. 195, 198-99 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
138. Id. at 199.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. (quoting Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1540 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984) (emphasis in original)). In light of Roberts" rejection of
preemption, it is logical that Judge Rovner held that a label approved under FIFRA does
not preclude the finding of strict liability under theories other than failure to warn when
an unavoidably unsafe product is involved. What is surprising is that the cases which
have found that FIFRA preempts state law do not reach this next logical step.
142. The court in Wilson v. Chevron Chem. Co., No. 83 Civ. 762 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17,
1986) found that compliance with FIFRA does not preempt punitive damages.
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inadequate warnings.143
In Fitzgerald v. Mallinckrodt, Inc.,'" the court found that the plain
language of section 136v(b) was sufficiently clear to find that Congress
intended to preempt state law. 145 Judge Suhrheinrich wrote that Con-
gress' expressly stated intent to preempt any state law in FIFRA differed
from typical federal statutes where "divining whether Congress intended
to preempt state law [was] a difficult, haphazard process."'"
After carefully considering and comparing Ferebee and Palmer v. Lig-
get Group, Inc., 47 two United States Circuit Court of Appeals decisions,
the Fitzgerald court found the reasoning of Palmer more persuasive. 48
In Palmer, the court held that the FCLAA preempts state common law
claims. 4 9 The court acknowledged Ferebee's narrow holding that
FIFRA expressly preempted the states only from directly imposing addi-
tional labeling requirements, 150 but questioned the reasoning in the case
that actions based on the inadequacy of EPA-approved labels have a reg-
ulatory effect. The Fitzgerald court found that such actions are "not
equivalent to a direct regulatory command that [the manufacturer]
change its label.""'' In rejecting Ferebee, the court found support in
Palmer which made a similar argument when discussing FCLAA. 152
Palmer pointed out that the FCLAA's preemption clause "expressly pro-
hibits 'state law' not merely 'statutory law' from imposing any 'require-
ment or prohibition' different from the Act's warning label."' 5 3 The
court stated that:
143. See, e.g., Herr, et al. v. Carolina Log Builders, Inc., et al., slip op. EV 85-262-C
through EV 85-268-C (S.D. Ind. Sept. 22, 1989); Papas v. Upjohn Co., No. 88-116-Civ-J-
14 (M.D. Fla., Aug. 2, 1989), appeal pending; Kennan v. Dow Chem. Co., 717 F. Supp.
799 (M.D. Fla. 1989); Wixson, et al. v. Sonford Products Corp., et al., Nos. 24,847;
24,502; 24,846 (Chancery Court, Rankin County, Miss., May 1, 1989); Bolduc v.
Chemed, No. 43-94-55 (Super. Ct., Orange County, Cal., April 10, 1989); Fitzgerald v.
Mallinckrodt, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. Mich. 1987). Both Papas and Kennan were
decided by Judge Susan Black. Since the decisions are virtually identical, the authors
have cited only to the published decision, Kennan. All citations to Kennan are equally
applicable to Papas.
144. 681 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
145. Id. at 406. "[The language of the statute appears to clearly indicate Congres-
sional intent to preempt state labeling requirements... " Id.
146. Id.
147. 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987).
148. Fitzgerald v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 681 F. Supp. at 407.
149. Palmer, 825 F.2d at 626.
150. Id.
151. Fitzgerald v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 404, 407 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (quot-
ing Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1541 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1062 (1984)).
152. Fitzgerald, 681 F. Supp. at 407.
153. Palmer v. Liggett Gp., Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 627 (1st Cir. 1987). The FCLAA
states:
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement re-
quired by section 1333 of this title, shall be required on any cigarette package.
(b) No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be im-
posed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any ciga-
PREEMPTION AND FIFRA
If a manufacturer's warning that complies with the Act is found inade-
quate under a state tort theory, the damages awarded and verdict ren-
dered against it can be viewed as state regulation: the decision
effectively compels the manufacturer to alter its warning to conform to
different state law requirements as "promulgated" by a jury's
findings. ' 4
The First Circuit thus rejected the district court's finding that an award
of damages under state law "would have only an indirect effect on de-
fendants' labeling and advertising practices." '55 The First Circuit also
rejected the plaintiffs' assertion that "monetary damages awarded would
not [necessarily] compel a manufacturer to change its label [because],
'the choice of how to react is left to the manufacturer.' "156 The court
compared this choice of reaction to "the free choice of coming up for air
after being under water." '15 7 The Palmer court believed that to minimize
its exposure to continued liability, a manufacturer would necessarily
change its label.158 Therefore, the ability to award damages for inade-
quately labeled products "arrogates to a single jury the regulatory power
explicitly denied to all fifty states' legislative bodies."'
159
In deciding to follow Palmer rather than Ferebee, the Fitzgerald court
noted that FIFRA's preemption clause prohibits the imposition by a
state of "any requirement for labeling or packaging."'" ° This parallels
the FCLAA's preemption language. 16 1  The court concluded that
"[a]llowing recovery under state tort law where Congress has preempted
state law would effectively authorize the state to do through the back
door exactly what it cannot through the front."
162
Two years later, Judge Black, who considered both the Ferebee and
Fitzgerald cases when deciding Kennan v. Dow Chemical Co.,' 63 agreed
that jury verdicts constitute "back door" labeling regulations.' 61 She dis-
agreed with Ferebee, stating that the court "must reject any argument
holding that a state court jury verdict would merely leave to the manu-
rettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of
this chapter.
15 U.S.C. § 1334, quoted in Palmer, 825 F.2d at 624.
154. Fitzgerald, 681 F. Supp. at 407 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (quoting Palmer, 825 F.2d at
627).
155. Palmer v. Liggett Gp., Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1171, 1177 (D. Mass. 1986), rev'd, 825
F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987). The First Circuit said that "the regulatory effect of the Palmers'
claim is direct, and must be preempted by the Act." Palmer, 825 F.2d at 628.
156. Palmer, 825 F.2d at 627.
157. Id.
158. See id. at 628.
159. Id.
160. Fitzgerald v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 404, 407 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (quot-
ing 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b)). See supra note 134 for the FCLAA's preemption language.
161. See Palmer v. Liggett Gp., Inc. 825 F.2d 620, 624 (1st Cir. 1987).
162. Id.
163. 717 F. Supp. 799, 805-06 (M.D. Fla. 1989).
164. Id. at 806.
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facturer the 'choice of how to react' to such jury verdict," '165 and ques-
tioned its precedential value by pointing out that the United States
Supreme Court had also rejected the "choice of reaction analysis"' 66 in
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette.67
Ouellette involved an action against a paper mill located in the state of
New York that discharged effluents into Lake Champlain pursuant to a
permit issued by the EPA under Section 125, et seq. of the Clean Water
Act (CWA). 16 s The plaintiffs were residents of Vermont who owned
property on the Vermont shore of the lake. They alleged that the dis-
charge constituted common law nuisance under Vermont law.'69 The
paper mill raised a preemption defense based on the prohibition of the
CWA against state regulation of out-of-state sources of effluents. 170 The
U.S. Supreme Court upheld the preemption defense on the ground that a
jury verdict based on the Vermont law would subject the discharger to
the threat of legal and equitable penalties. 17' The Court was convinced
that "[s]uch penalties would compel the source to adopt different control
standards and a different compliance schedule from those approved by
the EPA.' 72 Furthermore, the Court wrote that a recovery by the
plaintiffs would force the defendant to "at a minimum. . . change its
methods of doing business and controlling pollution to avoid the threat
of ongoing liability."'' 73 The Court refused to impose this fate on the
defendant and to allow the affected state to "do indirectly what [it] could
not do directly-regulate the conduct of out-of-state sources."' 17 4
The Supreme Court was not so much concerned with the adverse effect
a monetary award against the defendant would have but, rather, was
more interested in upholding what it deemed to be the congressional in-
tent of the Act. 17 Since the CWA did not contain express language pre-
empting state law, the Court focused on the goals and policies of the
Act.1 76 After having fully examined the statute, Justice Powell con-
cluded that if various states were allowed to impose separate discharge
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. 479 U.S. 481 (1987). Eighteen years prior to deciding Ouellette, the Supreme
Court acknowledged the regulatory power of jury verdicts based on tort law: "Regula-
tion can be as effectively exerted through an award of damages as through some form of
preventive relief. The obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a
potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy." San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959).
168. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481; See Note, International Paper Co. v. Ouellette: Uneasy
Resolution of which State's Law to Apply in Interstate Water Pollution Disputes, 1 FORD-
HAM ENVTL. L. REP. 119 (1989).
169. Ouellette at 484.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 495.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See id. at 492-94.
176. See id. at 493-94.
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standards on a single point source, "the inevitable result would be a seri-
ous interference with the achievement of the 'full purposes and objectives
of Congress.' ,177
After considering Ferebee, Fitzgerald and Ouellette, Judge Black
agreed with Justice Powell that a state court jury verdict would be tanta-
mount to regulating the content of a pesticide label already approved by
the EPA. 171 The court therefore dismissed the plaintiffs' state law claims
because "FIFRA expressly preempts state law regulation of pesticide
labeling."'
179
C. FIFRA Impliedly Preempts States Law
Fitzgerald, Kennan and other cases holding that FIFRA expressly
preempts state tort law did not address the issue of implied preemption.
The only presently reported case holding that FIFRA impliedly
preempts state tort law is Fisher v. Chevron Chemical Co. ' Fisher rep-
resents a middle ground between Ferebee and the Kennan/Fitzgerald
school of thought. The court in Fisher felt that while there was no ex-
press preemption based on Congress' occupation of the field, state law
claims were impliedly preempted because of the existing conflict between
the purposes of FIFRA and state law. 8'
The district court immediately rejected the notion of express preemp-
tion and found that section 136v(b) showed cnly a congressional attempt
to preempt state labeling regulations. 82 The court, however, stated that
FIFRA did not expressly reflect an intent to preempt tort claims based
on state law.' The court relied on the general presumption against pre-
emption 1 4 and Congress' failure to expressly refer to tort law in section
136v(b). 1 5
The court also considered the defendant's claim that FIFRA impliedly
preempted state law in the area of pesticides since Congress occupied
that field. '8 6 The Fisher court concluded that in enacting FIFRA, Con-
177. Id. (quoting Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Medical Labs., Inc., 471
U.S. 707, 713 (1985)).
178. Kennan v. Dow Chem. Co., 717 F. Supp. 799, 806-07 (M.D. Fla. 1989).
179. Id. at 807.
180. 716 F. Supp. 1283 (W.D. Mo. 1989).
181. See id. at 1287.
182. See id. at 1286; see also 7 U.S.C. § 136(a).
183. Id. (emphasis in original).
184. Id. at 1287; see also Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981).
185. Id. Ferebee had also noted FIFRA's failure to explicitly preempt state damage
actions. Ferebee at 1542. Kennan and Fitzgerald read the prohibition in § 136v(b)
against "any" state requirements for labeling or packaging as a reference to both state
common and statutory law. See Kennan v. Dow Chem. Co., 717 F. Supp. 799, 806-07
(M.D. Fla. 1989); Fitzgerald, 681 F. Supp. 404, 407 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
186. See Fisher v. Chevron Chem. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1283, 1287 (W.D. Mo. 1989).
The Supreme Court has delineated the basis for finding implied preemption based on
Congress' intent to comprehensively legislate so as to occupy an entire field of regulation.
See supra n. 79. For an analysis of implied preemption based on Congress' intent to
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gress intended to occupy the field of regulating pesticide labeling.'87
State regulation of the sale and use of pesticides, however, was not pre-
empted and states could impose regulations more stringent than man-
dated under federal law.188 Because of this reservation of authority by
the states, Fisher found that "the scheme created by FIFRA is not 'so
pervasive' or the federal interest is not 'so dominant' as to demonstrate
an intent to preempt all state law claims." 189
The Fisher court then examined the possibility that state tort law was
only impliedly preempted to the extent it actually conflicted with
FIFRA. 190 In order to determine whether or not a conflict existed, the
court examined FIFRA's goals and the effect of the state law on these
purposes. 19' Judge Bartlett wrote:
The principal purpose of FIFRA is to protect consumers by keeping
unhealthy or unsafe pesticides off the market and by preventing decep-
tive labeling. Congress sought to achieve this goal by regulating the
sale, use and labeling of pesticides. As to FIFRA's labeling provisions,
Congress has stated in 136v(b) that its goal will be undermined by state
law requirements which add to or differ from federal labeling
regulations. 192
In arguing against implied preemption, the plaintiffs in Fisher relied
heavily on passages in Ferebee where the court discussed the regulatory
aim of FIFRA and the effect of state tort remedies. 193 The defendants in
Fisher not surprisingly relied on Fitzgerald. 194 The court was persuaded
by the reasoning presented in Fitzgerald and Palmer that state law tort
recoveries based on the defendant's failure to adequately warn of the dan-
ger of pesticides would abrogate Congress' intent to provide uniform reg-
ulations for the labeling of pesticides.' 9
The court also addressed the attempt by the Roberts court 9 6 to distin-
occupy the field of cigarette labeling, see Cipollone v. Liggett Corp., 789 F.2d 181, 186
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987).
187. Fisher, 716 F. Supp. at 1287 (emphasis in original).
188. Id.
189. Id. (citing Roberts v. Dow Chem. Co., 702 F. Supp. 195, 199 (N.D. Ill. 1988)).
190. Fisher, 716 F. Supp. at 1287.
191. Id. (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Corp., 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1043 (1987)).
192. Fisher v. Chevron Chem. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1283, 1287 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (cita-
tions omitted).
193. Id. at 1288.
194. Id. Fisher was decided prior to Kennan.
195. Fisher, 716 F. Supp. at 1289 (citing Fitzgerald v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., Inc., 681 F.
Supp. 404, 407 (E.D. Mich. 1987)). It should be remembered that while the Fitzgerald
court expressed the opinion that tort recoveries interfere with Congress' plan to create
uniform regulations under the auspices of the EPA, its decision found express preemption
and did not address the issue of implied preemption. The Fisher court wrote that "the
Fitzgerald court's reasoning is persuasive while Ferebee seems to be justifying weakly a
result."
196. The very fact that Congress mandated the precise wording required in a label,
rather than merely establish the "minimum requirements" standard often found in label-
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guish the FCLAA cases from FIFRA.' 97 It held that the fact that Con-
gress on the one hand requires a specific warning to be placed on every
package of cigarettes and on the other hand prescribes that pesticide
manufacturers submit proposed warnings to the EPA, is "a distinction
without significance"' 9' since both FIFRA and FCLAA expressly pro-
hibit states from regulating any aspects of labeling.
Having rejected both the Ferebee and Roberts cases, the court in Fisher
found that FIFRA impliedly preempted state tort law claims for the in-
adequate labeling of pesticides because the state laws are in conflict with
FIFRA's purpose. 199
CONCLUSION
The cases decided thus far that have discussed FIFRA's preemptive
power over state tort law have reached three distinct conclusions and
have spawned their respective progeny.
Currently there is a case pending in the 11 th Circuit entitled Papas v.
Upjohn Co.2 which raises the issue of the preemption power of FIFRA.
The decision will have an important impact on the three different schools
of thought and on the future of FIFRA preemption. If the appellate
court overturns Papas, then two circuits will be in accord that preemp-
tion does not apply. If the court affirms, however, there will be a split in
the circuits which may set the stage for Supreme Court determination.
It is the authors' view that preemption of state law, at least in the area
of alleged warning defects, is consistent with FIFRA's stated purposes.
FIFRA provides a comprehensive regulatory scheme which balances the
goals of effective and cost efficient pest control with the need to protect
humankind and the environment. The statute makes pesticide manufac-
turers accountable to one central authority, which requires them to sub-
mit toxicity and efficacy studies, ingredient statements and proposed
labels. Manufacturers may not market products unless the EPA ap-
proves of the form and content of their labels. FIFRA moreover empow-
ers the administration of the EPA to enforce its regulations.
We believe Congress legislated comprehensively in the area of pesti-
cide design, manufacturing and marketing and, therefore, state tort law
claims which have the effect of further regulating these products should
not be allowed.
ing acts distinguishes the [Cigarette] Act from cases relied upon by the court and the
Palmers as persuasive authority. Roberts v. Dow Chem. Co., 702 F. Supp. 195 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (quoting Palmer v. Liggett Gp., Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 623, n. 5). See, e.g., Ferebee v.
Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984) (in-
volving FIFRA minimum labeling standards).
197. Fisher v. Chevron Chem. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1283, 1289 (W.D. Mo. 1989).
198. Id.
199. See id.
200. Case No. 88-116-Ci'-J-14 (M.D. Fla., Aug. 2, 1989).
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